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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Walters, discussed above, from ever arising again.13 The statute, as
it now stands, also embraces a case where there are three subscribing
witnesses who are legatees. Even in such a case, a witness would not
be protected, for the statute demands two other subscribing witnesses
who are not beneficiaries. The statute aims to provide equal treat-
ment of all legatee-witnesses and its language seems clear enough to
effect its purpose.
CATHERINE MCCARTHY.
ACTIONS To BE COMMENCED WITHIN SIX YEARS
A legislative nwte on the present statute of the period of limitations in
stockholder's derivative actions
A recently passed amendment concerning the rights of stockhold-
ers in derivative actions has thrown an entirely new light on what was
heretofore a confused, ambiguous and indiscernible rule. This stat-
ute, a section of the Civil Practice Act, provides for a clear and satis-
factory method of computing the time within which derivative actions
may be brought under varying facts.' To better appreciate and un-
derstand the significance of this new rule let us briefly examine the
earlier situation. Formerly, in determining the period of limitation
several theories were advanced. The earliest and most adhered to
was the trust or equitable theory, wherein the action was brought by
the stockholder as trustor against the directors as trustees of the cor-
porate property. In Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick 2 it was held that the
director was the "guardian" of the corporate property and answerable
and responsible to the stockholders for any misconduct. All trust
13Note of Commission, McKINNEY, DEc. EsT. LAW (1942) Supp. 49.
". The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the circumvention of the
statute in the manner outlined in Matter of Walters (285 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E.
[2d] 72) .... "
'Section 48 (subd. 8, added by L. 1942, c. 851, in effect Sept. 1) : "Actions
to be commenced within six years. The following actions must be commenced
within six years after the cause of action has accrued ...
"Subd. 8. An action legal or equitable, by or on behalf of a cor-
poration against a director, officer, or stockholder, or a former director,
officer, or stockholder, if such action is for an accounting, or to procurejudgment on the ground of fraud, or to recover a penalty or forfeiture
imposed or to enforce a liability created by common law or by statute
unless such action is one to recover damages for waste or for an injury
to property or for an accounting in connection therewith in which case
such action shall be subject to the 1rovisions of subdivision seven of
section forty-nine."
2 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663 (1885).
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concepts arising in equity provide for the ten-year period of limita-
tion. Subsequent cases held to the ten-year period after the basic
reason for its invocation had been discarded. As stated in the leading
case of Potter v. Walker 3 the trust theory had given way to a compu-
tation determined by nature of the individual case. For example, if
the court found the plaintiff had a remedy at law or had actually
sought one there in the first instance, the period governing actions at
law was applicable.
Thus the ten-year statute became obsolete except where the relief
sought was in fact equitable. This rule, however, led to greater diffi-
culty, for the next problem was to determine when the plaintiff had an
equitable remedy and when it was legal. Stress was always laid on
the nature of the complaint and never the facts or circumstances sur-
rounding the individual case. Once the plaintiff had categorized him-
self in the legal courts, there remained the further classification of the
type of corporation the director represented and what relief the stock-
holder was seeking. We might offer this summary 4 as a part of the
ritual involved in the attempt of suiting the plaintiff to the proper
remedy.
A-Was the action equitable or legal?
I-If it was equity he sought-the ten-year period.
I-If the remedy was not exclusively equitable but
(a) the corporation was a moneyed corporation the
three-year period applied as of the time from the
discovery of the facts.
(b) where it was not a moneyed corporation:
(1) Six years in actions for money had and re-
ceived.
(2) Three years for injury to property.
(3) Six years after discovery of facts in fraud
actions.
This intricate and complex yet apparently simple formula led to
chaos and confusion. If the plaintiff sought to recover profits from
the conspiring directors and based his action on a money-had-and-
received theory, he went to law and was entitled to recover as damages
all he had put in issue. If another under the same set of facts had
sought a similar remedy, but had petitioned equity for an accounting,
he was entitled to recover all sums he knew of and all those disclosed
after an examination of the books. We see, therefore, as pointed out
in Falk v. Hoffiman,5 the plaintiff at law got exactly what he sought
3276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
4 Law Revision Commission Report, Lzais. Doc. No. 65(E) (1942).
5233 N. Y. 199 (1922).
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and not what the facts in the case as brought out at trial might reveal.
An even finer distinction then arose; this reasoning enabled many an
over-crowded court to almost "dump" their cases into equity. If it
were found that the facts in the case were too complex, if they were
replete with confusing features and figures, the proper niche was
equity and not law. There a capable and experienced judge might
thoroughly be apprised of the facts, instead of having the average
minds of a jury at law pass upon them. 6 Thus we have the trust
concept from earliest times, and now the complex-features cases.
Finally, the courts had great difficulty in distinguishing between
the money-had-and-received theory and the equitable accounting rule.
In Falk v. Hoffman 7 it was held the adequacy of uncovering con-
cealed profits of the directors far excelled the legal remedy, that the
probative nature of equity will reveal facts dormant at law. Further,
that together with the trust concept requiring a great degree of care
due to a fiduciary relationship between the two, equity will afford
greater relief. This method would compel the director to come forth
and account for all profits realized, known or unknown. Of course
all actions arising from actions of negligence resulting in gain or profit
to the director were purely legal. Under the present classification or
statute, an action based upon negligence, where it is not alleged that
any wrongful profits were received by the directors at the expense of
the corporation, could not come under the new six-year statute but
would, of course, follow the six-year rule as provided in subdivision
three of Section 48 in actions for personal injuries.8 If, however, the
stockholder alleges the recipients of certain bonuses failed to return
the difference between the sums agreed upon under a corporate plan
and the sums actually received, the action falls under the new sub-
division eight and provides six years.9
In summation, we see that aside from the varying classification
of legal actions there was left to equity three cases: those of great com-
plexity, those requiring discovery and scrutiny of books, and those
involving the trust concept. It may be said here that such classifica-
tion soon outlived its purpose, for as time and courts developed, the
law courts found it easy to place all "complex" cases in the hands of a
referee where the jury might fail; that a bill of discovery could be
entertained to search books, records, and documents before the trial,10
that actions for accounting should be given equal consideration as to
time with those concerning fraud, or recovery of penalties.
It can hardly be said that after a cursory glance at the past his-
tory of this subject the framers of this amendment were rash or
unreasonable in their demand for a coherent and logical statute that
would perimit causes of action deserving a day in court, an opportunity
6 Cwerdinski v. Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, aff'd, 281 N. Y. 782 (1939).
7 See note 5 mtpra.
8 Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
9 Cwerdinski v. Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, aff'd, 281 N. Y. 782 (1939).
10 Mencher v. Richards, 283 N. Y. 176, 27 N. E. (2d) 982 (1940).
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to be heard according to the merits of the particular case based upon
reasonable and practical rules of procedure rather than some arbitrary
fanciful rules that were as varied and many as the cases from which
they arose.
GLORIA M. P QUINOT.
PENAL LAW §§ 1290 AND 1290a-LARcENY REDEFINED.-When
§ 1290 of the Penal Law was passed, it was thought that the common
law distinctions between obtaining money under false pretenses, em-
bezzlement and larceny, were extinguished in New York. Larceny,
under this section was to include all these three.' When put into
practice, however, it was found that these old distinctions were elimi-
nated in name only. Although the indictment did not have to allege
a particular type of larceny by name,2 it was still necessary to allege
facts to prove the particular offense charged.3 For example, an in-
dictment alleging common law larceny, could not be sustained by
proof of an act which would constitute the crime of embezzlement or
false pretenses.4 This was true despite the fact that all these were
"larceny".
A great deal of confusion arose because of the subtle distinctions
which arose from decisions differentiating between the various classes
of larceny. If an accused had induced the victim to pass only posses-
sion to him, the crime was larceny by trick and device. If the victim
intended to pass title to the thief, the crime was obtaining goods by
false pretenses.; Another distinction was that between embezzlement
and larceny by trick and device. If a person obtained the property of
another and thereafter appropriated it to his own use, the crime was
embezzlement if the intent to use the property for his own purposes
was formed after he received the property. If, however, such intent
was formed before the receipt of the property, the crime was larceny
by trick and device.
Prosecuting attorneys found themselves faced with a very diffi-
cult task. Many a defendant was freed because the indictment charged
one type of larceny while the facts showed defendant was guilty of
another. In some cases, it was impossible for the prosecutor to deter-
' People v. Krumme, 161 Misc. 278, 292 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1936) ; People v.
Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305 (1913); People v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339,
62 N. E. 418 (1902).
2 People v. Dunn, 53 Hun 381, 6 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1889).
3 People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887).
4People v. Sloane, 165 Misc. 444, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1938), mod., 254
App. Div. 780, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 724, 18 N. E. (2d)
679 (1939).
6 People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927); People v. Dumar,
106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887) (It is interesting to note the dissenting
opinion of Judge Ciane in the Noblett case).
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